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Winning the War in Afghanistan:
 Echoes of Northern Ireland and the IRA?
S  ,  T regime was deposed by Operation Enduring Freedom, 
and a seemingly new future was offered (if not promised) to Afghanistan. Yet today, 
Afghanistan is anything but a stable and secure country. 5e spiralling Afghan insur-
gency, as well as a responsive counterinsurgency, has claimed the lives of over 3,200 
people this year alone.1  
It is reasonable to argue that 2008 has witnessed Afghanistan fall further into the 
abyss of instability and chaos: the re-emergent Taliban2 seems stronger than ever and 
has even been able to install shadow governments in certain districts in the east and 
south of the country. Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden remain very much alive and 
influential in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s regime, 
which has minimal influence outside of the Kabul city limits, is increasingly viewed as 
illegitimate by non-Kabuli Afghans.3 Corruption driven by record opium crops4 still 
permeates all levels of society and government. Lastly, civilian death tolls continue to 
mount5 and fissures are beginning to appear in NATO’s International Security Assis-
tance Force (ISAF) coalition. 
5e problems in Afghanistan are compounded by the fact that the ongoing po-
litical and military crisis in Afghanistan has been partially eclipsed by contemporary 
problems in Iraq. But it is arguably Afghanistan, rather than Iraq, that is the more 
significant theatre in the war on terror. 5e depth and urgency of the Afghan crisis are 
evident from the escalation of insurgent violence, with 2007 being the most deadly 
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year since the initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom in October 2001. Last year 
witnessed a significant increase in Taliban and insurgent operations, making for a 
destabilization “surge.” Yet this year, things are even worse, as evidenced by Table 1, 
which presents coalition military fatalities by month and year. It is clear that 2008 will 
continue the trend of annual increases in coalition fatalities and serve as an additional 
indicator that things are not well in Afghanistan. 
 
Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total
2001 3 5 4 12
2002 10 12 14 10 1 3 0 3 1 6 1 8 69
2003 4 7 12 2 2 7 2 4 2 6 8 1 57
2004 11 2 3 3 9 5 2 3 4 8 7 1 58
2005 2 2 6 19 4 29 2 33 12 10 7 4 130
2006 1 17 13 5 17 22 19 29 38 17 9 4 191
2007 2 18 10 20 25 24 29 34 24 15 22 9 232
2008 14 7 19 14 24 45 30 45 198
Table 1: Coalition Military Fatalities By Year and Month6
5e insurgency has moved significantly beyond the south and east of the country 
and is now even closing in on Kabul. 5e Senlis Council has recently written that “the 
Taliban has shown itself to be a truly resurgent force” with an “ability to establish a 
presence throughout the country.”7
5e current approach of the U.S. and its NATO allies in Afghanistan is simply not 
working, and our strategy in this vital setting for the struggle against terrorism urgently 
requires rethinking. 5is article is based on the assumption that such a rethinking re-
quires both a deep contextual knowledge of the Afghan political and security situation 
and an ability to learn from the lessons of post-conflict and violence-plagued zones 
elsewhere. We draw on lessons learned from recent Northern Irish experiences of ter-
rorism and counterterrorism and consider these in relation to how we should proceed 
most effectively in the current and future situation within Afghanistan.
AFGHANISTAN:  NORTHERN IRELAND REDUX
5ere are, of course, some significant differences between the two settings considered 
here. 5e timeline is different, with the Northern Ireland conflict erupting in the late 
1960s and the immediate Afghan crisis emerging as this century’s phenomenon; the 
historical contexts of the Afghan state and the Northern Ireland state are different; the 
religious cultures involved in the Northern Ireland and Afghanistan combatant groups 
diverge in significant and drastic respects; and the respective scales of disorder, crisis, 
and military engagement have been different in the two places.8
However, there are striking echoes and similarities between the Northern Irish 
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and Afghan cases. 
First, in each case, we find the extraordinary power of religiously infused ethnic 
identity. 5e Provisional IRA emerged and fought as an explicitly nationalist move-
ment, pursuing the goal of national self-determination and attempting to further the 
communal interests of the Irish people as such. But it did so with backing from a very 
particular ethnic community within Northern Ireland—the nationalist community 
there—and this community was overwhelmingly drawn from one side of a starkly 
drawn religious divide between Catholics and Protestants. In terms of membership, the 
IRA was almost exclusively Catholic; Irish nationalism had, since the early nineteenth 
century, effectively been a Catholic phenomenon.9
Parallel to the conflict in Ireland is that of Afghanistan. Proto-nationalist Taliban 
and other insurgent groups are seeking to overthrow the democratically elected Afghan 
government in favor of a state run almost exclusively by leaders of the Pashtun ethnic-
ity, according to a very specific (and bastardized) code of Deobandi Islam.10  Fiercely 
xenophobic and long the rivals of other ethno-linguistic groups in Afghanistan, the 
Taliban has also sought to construe its opponents as un-Islamic for their belief in other 
sects or schools of Islamic law.
Second, in both cases we see the profound intersection of rival nationalisms with 
violence, as well as considerable tension between nation and state. Both cases also point 
toward the political importance of historic tensions between nation and state and the 
significance of fierce opposition to foreign rule. In Ireland, the IRA felt that the six-
county state in the northeast was wrongly incorporated into a hostile state (the United 
Kingdom) and that violence was legitimate as the only effective means of liberating 
that territory from British 
control. 5e IRA sought the 
establishment of an inde-
pendent and united Ireland: 
a state comprising the entire 
Irish island and one that was 
fully independent of British power. Similarly, the Taliban seeks to establish an Islamic 
Emirate in Afghanistan of the type they almost had from 1996 to 2001. To their minds, 
all that prevents them from achieving this goal is the presence of foreign troops, even 
if the majority of Afghans have no desire to return to Taliban rule either.
5ird, both the IRA and the Taliban have practiced violence that has straddled 
the division between terrorism and insurgent or guerrilla warfare. 5is is a vital point. If 
terrorism is defined according to the U.S. State Department (“premeditated, politically 
motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups 
or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience”),11 then it is clear 
Proto-nationalist Taliban and other insurgent 
groups are seeking to overthrow the democratically 
elected Afghan government in favor of a state run 
according to a very specific code of Deobandi Islam.
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that both the IRA and the Taliban have indeed practiced terrorism but also that not 
all of their violence has been terrorist in nature. 5e IRA did kill hundreds of civilians, 
many of them murdered in an unambiguously terrorist fashion. However, it also more 
frequently killed military or 
security personnel. 5e Tal-
iban treads the line between 
terrorism and insurgency 
as well. Undoubtedly they 
would like to be insurgents, but without true popular support they are relegated to 
terrorist and criminal acts in order to perpetuate their organization. 5is can most 
easily be seen in the surge in the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and in 
suicide attacks, as well as their increasing reliance on narcotics as a source of revenue. 
Additionally, the Taliban has been attacking in much larger units than they were previ-
ously and overrunning district centers with alarming frequency.
In both the Irish and Afghan cases, we have seen a deployment of violence for 
political ends in ways that include terrorism. Despite an understandable tendency for 
Western governments to highlight the terrorist complexion of their enemies’ campaigns, 
this combination of different forms of violence is often what we actually face when 
dealing with terrorism across much of the world. An effective response to this challenge 
requires honest recognition of such a reality.
Finally, there are also numerous organizational similarities between our two 
case studies. Both the IRA and the Taliban have benefited very significantly from 
international support. In the IRA’s case, this involved both the backing of some U.S. 
sympathizers and the help offered by sympathetic regimes, including that of Libya’s 
Colonel Gaddafi.12
Such international support networks provided money, weaponry, and other forms 
of important backing for the IRA’s lengthy campaign. 5e IRA also made good use of 
the porous border between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic, storing weapons 
in the latter (beyond the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom) and often launching 
attacks from or establishing safe havens in the Republic rather than in the more deeply 
hostile atmosphere of the north. 
Outside support and areas of safe haven have also been vital for the Taliban. In 
terms of comparison, one could easily equate the financial support of Irish-Americans 
for the IRA to that given the Taliban by Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) and 
the Saudi intelligence and government. 5e Taliban, reliant on external funding, have 
managed to maintain strong financial ties outside Afghanistan’s borders, and gunrun-
ning has been closely linked to financial support in both the Afghan and Irish cases. 
Again, the Taliban have enjoyed the benefits of secure and reliable areas of geographic 
In both the Irish and Afghan cases, we 
have seen a deployment of violence for po-
litical ends in ways that include terrorism.
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safe haven in Pakistan.
5e Provisional IRA, particularly from the mid-1970s onwards, gave great orga-
nizational autonomy to local operatives. Initially organized along traditional military 
lines (into brigades, battalions, and so forth), the IRA then moved during the 1970s 
toward a more flexible cellular structure, with the result that considerable initiative 
and autonomy were enjoyed by local units. 5is reflected and reinforced the varied 
pattern of IRA activity with some areas, such as south Armagh, becoming particularly 
dynamic and active.13 5is is a pattern echoed in Afghanistan. For example, the Quetta 
Shura, controlled by Mullah Omar, was able to exert its will throughout much of the 
area controlled by the Taliban. In the current insurgent environment, however, it has 
proved much more difficult for the Taliban to maintain any effective central control 
over the various commanders throughout the provinces. Today’s Taliban is being forced 
once again to depend on operations originated and executed at the local level, with 
the shuras attempting to at least exude the appearance of control.14 5is has led to a 
number of localized political and tribal accommodations and complexities. 
Within Northern Ireland, much of the IRA’s energy and activity has been de-
voted to intracommunal efforts at control, a phenomenon that has existed long into 
the peace process period of the 1990s and beyond. Punishment beatings, shootings, 
intimidation, and murder have all been used in order to establish, maintain, and 
enforce control in areas populated by republican constituencies. 5is intracommunal 
dimension of the IRA’s long war was often eclipsed by its conflict with the British state 
and with the unionists of Northern Ireland. But intracommunal punishment attacks 
occupied much of the Provisionals’ energy, as those Catholics in the north who were 
deemed to be engaged in antisocial action (such as repeated house robberies, car thefts, 
or joy-riding) were brutally policed with, for example, beatings or kneecappings (the 
shooting of victims through their knees). 5ese were extremely numerous, with Irish 
republicans carrying out 1,228 punishment shootings between 1973 and 1997, and a 
further 755 beatings from 1982 to 1997.15
Clearly, there was a problem in some republican areas with petty (and with not 
so petty) crime; it also seems clear that in some cases people’s real crime was to have 
defied the writ of the IRA. Intracommunal vendettas and power struggles played their 
part in these gruesome IRA policing methods. In Afghanistan, a significant part of the 
Taliban’s appeal and strength has been its willingness and ability to impose law and order 
amid chaos.16 Prior to their ouster in 2001, many crimes in areas they controlled were 
punished summarily and brutally. 5e person punished may not have always been the 
guilty party, but someone was always punished. Despite economic reliance on opium 
production, the Taliban did wage a short yet successful campaign against the cultivation 
of poppy throughout much of the country. Today, the Taliban is forced to deal with a 
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number of rival internal and external factions often with competing interests: Gulbud-
din Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami (HiG), the Tora Bora Front, the Haqqani network, 
various warlords, and other groups linked to the former Northern Alliance. While 
the Taliban may show a willingness to cooperate with some of these groups due to a 
shared animosity toward the Karzai government and international forces, they harbor 
no long-term power-sharing plans with these factions. 5e result is occasional violent 
clashes between these groups and a willingness to betray their temporary partners to 
the coalition or the Karzai government. Indeed, groups such as HiG are consistently 
formulating plans to supplant the Taliban in case the Karzai government falls. Just 
as those deemed to be cooperating with the IRA’s enemies in Ireland were frequently 
targeted and punished as a result, so too the Taliban wages a constant campaign against 
those who may sympathize or work with the Karzai government, international forces, 
or even international aid organizations. Ignoring the Taliban’s threats has often resulted 
in bombings, assassinations, public executions, and increasing levels of threats.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE AFGHAN AND IRISH CASES
What lessons can we draw from reflection on these significant Afghan-Irish compari-
sons? Are there broader implications for how to deal with the crisis in Afghanistan, and 
indeed with the problems posed by terrorist and insurgent violence in other settings? 
Five points are especially important.
First, in both the Northern Irish 1970s and the post-9/11 era of the war on terror, 
we can clearly see the counterproductive dangers of over-militarizing our response to 
terrorism. In this sense, the war on terror model has arguably been an obstacle rather 
than an advantage in recent years. Superior military force, well-suited to the winning 
of formal military conflict, has proved repeatedly counter-productive in settings where 
the state faces embedded terrorist and insurgent violence. 
In 1970s Northern Ireland, the British Army did eventually help to contain the 
worst excesses of intercommunal disorder, but at a high price in terms of the anti-state 
disaffection that they had generated in the process. One-sided curfew and internment 
policies between 1970 and 1971—combined with heavy-handed treatment of internees 
and of suspect communities beyond the jails—helped to stimulate precisely the kind of 
anti-state terrorist violence that such measures had been intended to uproot. Friction 
between the British Army and the Catholic working class in Belfast and Derry from 
1970 to 1972 pushed people towards, rather than away from, the Provisional IRA and 
made the IRA a far more significant force than they would have been otherwise.
In Afghanistan, there is a similar dynamic in effect. As one Pakistani diplomat 
told the International Crisis Group, “When a child is killed in one of these villages, 
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that village is lost for 100 years. 5ese places run on revenge.”17 Given the current 
methods of dislodging hostile elements via long-range weaponry, civilian casualties have 
plagued U.S. and NATO efforts since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom 
in 2001. 5e Taliban and other groups have used this to their advantage by sheltering 
themselves within civilian areas, using the population as a shield. Some villages have 
resisted these Taliban incursions, but many are unable to do so, so that when artillery 
and aerial bombardment strike the village, it bears a U.S. stamp. 5e metric the United 
States has used in Afghanistan for “collateral damage” has been disastrous. As noted on 
CBS’s 60 Minutes in October 2007, up to 30 civilians may be killed in order to kill or 
capture a high-value target. 5is is absolutely unacceptable and extremely detrimental 
to the stated mission of the U.S. government in Afghanistan.
5ere is a very counter-productive set of effects that can be produced when states 
drift across the Weberian line of legitimacy18 that divides them from their terrorist op-
ponents. 5e abuse of human rights in settings such as Northern Irish internment in 
the 1970s—or more recently in Guantanamo Bay or Abu Ghraib—might be considered 
slight when set against the atrocities of either the Provisional IRA, al-Qaeda, or the 
Taliban. But this misses the central issue: namely, that our primary objection to such 
human rights abuses should be that they demean both state and victim and that they 
simultaneously widen the pool of disaffected opponents willing to join precisely those 
terrorist groups we want to stifle. In Northern Ireland, the embryonic IRA told people 
that the British state was a brutal colonial power, hostile to the Catholic community. 
5e one-sided Falls Curfew of 1970 in Belfast, the internment of many innocent 
Catholics from August 1971 onwards, and the fatal shooting by the Parachute Regi-
ment of 14 Catholic civilians on Bloody Sunday in January 1972 all seemed to make 
the IRA’s case more plausible. IRA recruits swelled as a result, and the lessons for our 
own times are clear enough.19
In a counterinsurgency, it is important that civilian casualties be kept to an ab-
solute minimum. When they do occur, it is important that the military force involved 
take responsibility for its actions, and if necessary make restitution or punish the guilty 
parties. While the military response to insurgency is far from ideal, coupled with good 
intelligence it can produce very successful counterterrorist efforts. By the latter days of 
the Northern Ireland conflict, the state had developed an extensive range of agents and 
informers within paramilitary groups such as the IRA, and this proved of greater value 
in countering their terrorist campaign than had the all-out deployment of the Parachute 
Regiment. By the late stages of the Northern Ireland Troubles, many (if not most) IRA 
operations came to be thwarted on the basis of prior state information; while the IRA’s 
campaign was not ended as a result, a ceiling was put on its capacity.20 
At the beginning of the Iraqi invasion in 2003, many U.S. units with language 
Johnson.indd   279 10/31/08   8:19:54 PM
     
T J  R E
280
and cultural training were shifted from Afghanistan to Iraq. 5e overall value of such 
experience and training became quickly evident as intelligence collection declined 
precipitously in Afghanistan. Evidently, the United States has ignored the value of 
experience in the theatre of war, deploying divisions to Afghanistan, then Iraq, and 
then back to Afghanistan. 
Second, in many of the settings in which the war on terror is being fought, we 
face in fact a combination of the terrorist and the communal-insurgent, and we have 
to recognize the frequently ethno-national basis for the resistance that we encounter. 
5e implications of this understanding are huge if what we seek is the basis for an 
end to conflict in settings such as 
Afghanistan. Not all conflicts can 
be resolved, of course. Where they 
can, however, it seems clear that 
durable and pervasive state legiti-
macy is the truly vital foundation 
for such resolution. 5is was certainly the case in Northern Ireland. 5e failure of 
the IRA’s violence to achieve its ostensible goals (British withdrawal or the defence of 
Catholic communities) established the basis for peace talks and some form of com-
promise deal. But the essence of that deal was the creation of a Northern Ireland state 
that could command the allegiance of the majority of both warring communities. 5is 
necessitated significant reform, and it involved recognition of the rival ethno-national 
aspirations and interests of the competing groups. 
5ird, if we do acknowledge (and seek) the possibility of a lasting settlement, 
then we have to recognize that this will involve protracted negotiation and that it will 
result in disagreeable ex-opponents being in power and pursuing what might seem 
unappetizing policies. In Northern Ireland’s twenty-first-century power-sharing govern-
ment, a prominent ex-IRA man (Sinn Fein’s Martin McGuinness) is the Deputy First 
Minister. McGuinness is on record as having been a proud member of the IRA,21 an 
organization that killed more people than did any other group in the Northern Ireland 
conflict. Yet his inclusion in government exemplifies two encouraging realities: first, 
that the method of campaign previously espoused by such figures has been judged by 
them not to be successful, and second, that such figures have the capacity to promote 
peaceful politics to a constituency previously hostile to the state and previously sup-
portive of anti-state violence.
In Afghanistan, the Taliban have to a certain extent fractured between Pashtun 
nationalists and global “jihadists,” seeking a greater Islamist state. 5e jihadist faction 
shows an increasing reliance on foreign fighters, suicide tactics, and harsh terror as a 
means of enforcement. 5e Pashtun nationalist wing, however, has proved more willing 
We face in Afghanistan a combination of the 
terrorist and the communal-insurgent, and we 
have to recognize the frequently ethno-nation-
al basis for the resistance that we encounter. 
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to negotiate. Many former pre-9/11 Taliban have been incorporated into the present 
government. It is entirely possible that the neutralization of the Taliban insurgency in 
Afghanistan will require the co-option of some of their leaders by the national govern-
ment. 
Also related to the overlap between terrorism and insurgency is a fourth point: 
the vital question of state credibility in response to terrorism. Clearly, terrorist vio-
lence—whether that of the Provisional IRA or of the Taliban—lacks moral or political 
legitimacy when considered in terms of its supposed justifications and efficacy. But there 
are dangers also in states drawing implausibly stark, Manichaean contrasts between 
their own violence and that of terrorist opponents. In terms of the terrorists’ support 
community, a depiction of the terrorist group as merely criminal, thug-like, inherently 
evil, fanatical, or insane will make it more difficult for the state to win the vital battle 
of hearts and minds within that constituency.
5e Northern Irish experience is telling here. During the late 1970s and early 
1980s the UK authorities attempted to present the IRA and other terrorist groups 
in Northern Ireland as ordinary criminals, and they sought to deal with paramilitary 
prisoners just as any other prisoners were treated. Prisoners refused to conform with 
the prison system, friction escalated between prison warders and inmates, and by 1980 
and 1981 they had reached such a stand-off that republican prisoners embarked on 
two hunger strikes in pursuit of political status, the latter strike involving ten prisoners 
famously starving themselves to death.22
It was quite understandable that the UK authorities wanted to delegitimize the 
actions of groups such as the IRA. It is also important to remember that, while the 
funeral of an IRA hunger striker like Bobby Sands gained much attention, the funerals 
of the 472 people killed by the IRA during the prison protests between 1976 and 1981 
should demand at least as much attention when we reflect on this era. 
Yet this prison war reflected the problems of states when they present terrorist op-
ponents in ways that lack credibility. Even those Irish nationalists who did not support 
the IRA (and this represented the majority of Irish nationalists)23 knew that the IRA’s 
activities were primarily motivated by political rather than merely criminal ambition. 
When the government forced people to decide between starving IRA prisoners’ claim 
to be political, and Prime Minister Margaret 5atcher’s denial of such status, very 
many non-IRA nationalists lost sympathy with the government, and UK credibility 
in the counterterrorist campaign was undermined. Moreover, there were alternatives. 
5e state presented a choice between seeing the IRA as political (and therefore legiti-
mate) or criminal (and therefore illegitimate). But a far more persuasive and credible 
way of presenting matters would have been to acknowledge the political nature of a 
group such as the IRA, but to point out that not all political campaigns are legitimate. 
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History abounds with political movements that are rightly denied legitimacy for their 
brutal actions (Hitler was unambiguously political), and such an approach would have 
allowed the government to retain more sympathy among the IRA’s potential support 
community.
In fighting terror, states damage themselves if their rhetoric, policies, and pro-
nouncements lack credibility among one’s own backers and among the potentially disaf-
fected. 5e presentation of widespread support for violent movements must resonate 
with what people will see on the ground to be the case. 5e Taliban movement initially 
came into being in an anarchic void; they had popular support because the southeast 
of the country existed without law or order, and the Taliban’s justice, however harsh, 
was still justice. One Afghan farmer tellingly remarked, after the chaos of the early 
1990s, that at least with the Taliban, one could leave their plow outside overnight, and 
in the morning it would still be there. 5is is precisely why the Taliban are trying to 
destabilize the security situation to the greatest extent possible, instead of focusing on 
strikes against foreign forces. 5e insecurity of insurgency proves the illegitimacy of 
the Afghan government and the international community that supports it. 5ey want 
to recreate the anarchic circumstances that led them to power in the first place. 
It was also this power vacuum that encouraged so many capable men to join the 
Taliban’s ranks; it was simply the only game in town. 5ese men may not be in complete 
agreement with the Taliban leadership, but they have goals that can be utilized by the 
Afghan government, namely the hope for a better Afghanistan. With the exception of 
the hard-core extremists, the Taliban can be co-opted. Karzai has publicly stated that 
all but a few of the Taliban are “reconcilable.” 
Fifth, we must recognize and utilize the essential rationality of our opponents 
and their support group. 5e lesson of the Northern Irish peace process is that it was 
(in the end) the pragmatic rationality of the IRA that allowed for establishing an end 
to the conflict. 5e IRA had mistakenly thought that their violence was necessary and 
that it would produce victory. When (by the late 1980s) they recognized that violence 
would produce lasting stalemate rather than victorious success, they began to be open 
to the possibility of alternative means of achieving political momentum. States are 
often wary of acknowledging that their terrorist opponents act with the same mixture 
of the rational and the visceral that motivates most other people in politics. But we 
should use this reality to our advantage. In Ulster, when the IRA recognized that elec-
tions would yield greater results than car bombs, they eventually swapped the latter 
for the former.
As previously stated, the Taliban is an organization with methods that serve ar-
ticulated goals, even if there is dissension among the ranks. To a certain extent, these 
goals are those of a legitimate government: the safety, security, and independence of 
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Afghanistan. 5ese aims, then, can be presented in such a way as a function of the 
present government of Afghanistan as to induce some insurgents to pursue their goals 
through other means. Just as the Taliban has moved from an insurgent force to a na-
tional government to an insurgent force again, so perhaps some part of their force can 
be persuaded to present their ideas in a civilized, democratic manner.
Were the Taliban to participate fully and openly in the democratic process in 
Afghanistan, there is a significant chance they could eventually push their politics to 
the dominant position in the state. If this were to happen, if they were slowly to be 
integrated into the process, they might eventually buy in to the system, having some 
stake in it. 5is could result in their attempting to protect the system and prevent their 
more zealous compatriots from subverting the government. 
5ere are those who would argue that no understanding can be reached with 
the opponents in a counterinsurgency, and that victory can only be won when the last 
insurgent is in his grave. Unfortunately, insurgencies are not tangible things; they exist 
in the minds of humans, 
and their physical manifes-
tations are but extensions 
of that thought process. 
In order to truly pacify a 
troubled land such as Northern Ireland or Afghanistan, opponents must be co-opted 
whenever possible, and force used only as a last resort. 5e British experience and time 
served in pacifying Northern Ireland holds a number of valuable lessons for foreign 
forces in Afghanistan today. For decades, the British sought through a combination 
of carrots and sticks to bring that fractured territory to heel, and their lessons learned 
deserve careful study for students of counterinsurgency. 5e five points mentioned 
above—avoiding an over-militarized response; understanding the ethno-national 
nature of the conflict; seeking settlements through political accommodation wherever 
possible, even where this empowers disagreeable ex-enemies; maintaining state cred-
ibility in argument and analysis; and recognizing and co-opting the rationality of our 
opponents—are all notions that have been crucial in Northern Ireland, where a durable 
peace seems finally to have been created.  
5ese points are also of high importance in Afghanistan, where such insights 
can provide the basis for successful policy. Delaying the implementation of the points 
presented here will prolong the Afghan insurgency and keep NATO troops in harm’s 
way; and as the British learned, every trooper on the ground and every armoured vehicle 
patrolling a neighbourhood were victories for insurgent propaganda. In Afghanistan, the 
circumstances are even direr: a successful insurgency in Afghanistan affects not only the 
nation itself, but its neighbors as well. And as we have seen, failure there can easily and 
Insurgencies are not tangible things; they exist in 
the minds of humans, and their physical manifesta-
tions are but extensions of that thought process.
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quickly result in death and destruction on our own shores. 5e parallels between the 
two conflicts considered in this article are true for many insurgencies. Ethnic, political 
and religious grudges are not so dissimilar from one another that certain themes cannot 
be isolated.  By doing so, we cannot only better understand the nature of the insurgent 
and insurgency, but we can seek to minimize that disagreement. To paraphrase Mao, if 
an effective insurgent must move among the people as a fish in the sea, the trick then is 
to get the fish out of water. In Northern Ireland the British eventually produced condi-
tions within which popular support for IRA violence could be eroded. In Afghanistan, 
we must strive to do the same. Only then will the insurgency wither. 
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